Desde o escândalo da Enron, em outubro de 2001, a divulgação de informação por parte das empresas, tem vindo a ganhar uma importância crescente.
A crise financeira, que atingiu a maior parte dos países desenvolvidos, sobretudo a partir de 2008, colocou no centro das atenções dos principais atores dos mercados financeiros – emitentes, investidores, reguladores, bancos, agências de rating e analistas -, a variável escassez de dinheiro disponível, para emprestar ou investir. Mas esta opção imposta pela conjuntura aos emitentes, provoca por outro lado, um aumento dos custos de processamento e divulgação da informação, ao mesmo tempo que expõe a estratégia da empresa aos seus mais diretos concorrentes.
O presente trabalho pretende fazer a revisão da literatura, no sentido de determinar em primeiro lugar quais as caraterísticas que explicam o nível de informação voluntária disponibilizada pelas empresas cotadas e seguidamente quais as vantagens e as desvantagens competitivas associadas à divulgação dessa mesma informação.
Rui Pedro Batista is a PhD student in Global Management, Strategy and Entrepreneurship (ISCTE-IUL Business School). He is an Invited Assistant Professor of Strategy at ISCTE and ISLA Campus Lisboa. In addition to her academic experience, Rui is member of the board of the leading media company im Portugal. He holds a Master in Management Sciences, with thesis in Corporate Valuation (Lusíada, 2000) and a graduation in Management, with specialization in Strategy.
Nelson António is an Full Professor of Strategy at ISCTE IUL Business School. He holds a PhD in Management (Bergishe Universitat Wuppertal/ Germany). He has been working as professor and strategy consultant for numerous companies seeking to internationalise their strategies to developing countries. He has published scientific articles in numerous international journals and books, and he is management professor in China (Xi’an Jiaotong University Management) and in Africa.
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crise financeira, informação voluntária, teoria da agência,